1: Niederle--35 E-5 1911 E/C Slavic Peoples E/C
Tsarist Russia R2

S.P. T.R. 172 chestnut, and 2% dark). Among the Great Russians, the following proportions are found: 37%, 41%, 22%; among the Ukrainians, 30%, 42%, 28%. Thus the Ukrainians have a greater leaning towards the darker type; but there are considerable differences within the group; for example, the proportions in Volhynia, according to Kozhukov are, 42%, 29%, 29%.

/49/ Among the Great Russians, the lightest in coloring are those of Tver and of Yaroslavl', the darkest, those of the eastern guberniyas. S.P. T.R. 141 From the point of view of the cephalic index, there are found among the Great Russians 9% dolichocephalic, 19% mesocephalic, and 72% brachycephalic. The corresponding percentages found among the Ukrainians are: 12%, 16%, 72%. Among the Belorussians there percentages are: 13%, 23%, 64%. There are further important variations. Thus the Ukrainians of the north are mainly brachycephalic; but a very considerable portion of dolichocephalics is to be found at Voronezh, at Poltava, in Volhynia.

No section of Russia furnishes so many dolichocephalics and mesocephalics as the Volhynia, peopled by Ukrainians (31% and 34%).

S.P. T.R. 144 In the same way the Gorals of the Carpathians present a type very distinct from that of the inhabitants of the plain. But here are the same phenomena which we observe among their neighbors the Poles. A contributing factor to the confusion of types is, among the Great Russians, cross-breeding with the Finns of the Volga; and among the Ukrainians, cross-breeding with the Turko-Tatar peoples.

S.P. T.R. 181 S 10.--All of these groups, large and small, differ from one another. But no difference is more pronounced than that between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians. The distinctions between the diverse tribes in the large groups /50/ are really only secondary. They are variations in dialect, in costume, in their manner of living. The difference between the Great Russians and the Belorussians is not more considerable than this, or at least appears not to be; the philologists are in agreement in stating that the Belorussians are a division of the Great Russians, or at least a very closely related branch.

Between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians the difference is greater. It exists not only in their speech, but in their physical and moral constitution, their character, temperament, popular songs,

S.P. T.R. 181 mores and customs. And this difference is further emphasized by their historical careers and in these latter years by their political divergences. These divergences go so far that they sometimes result in a rupture of all of the ties of kinship. The representatives of the intellectual class among the Ukrainians are unwilling to consider themselves as Russians, as a nation of the same origin and of the same character as the Russians. They tear the unity of the Russian world into two segments, into two nations: the one located to the north is made upof the Great Russians, the Russians Kat'eksokhln, /among the foreigners/ otherwise called Rossiani, the Moskali or the Moskvichi. The others, the people of the south, are the Little Russians, the Yugorusi (1), or, /51/ according

1. Russians of the south.

to a more recent appellation, the Ukrainians.

S.P. T.R. 101 Up until now there is no agreement as to the names to be used. The Great Russians and the foreigners, conforming to tradition, most frequently use the expressions: Great Russians, Little Russians, bearing in mind the historic name of Little Russia (excepting Galicia and Vladimir). The appellation of Iugorusi is less frequently encountered (for example in Pypin and in Kostomarov). The Little Russians do not care for these two names and forsome time have preferred that of Ukrainians. The Galicians employ the term Rusin with the adjective 'ruski' opposed to Rossianin, 'rossisky' for the Great Russians. This name has been adopted beyond the Russian borders, but it has not been accepted within them. The Gorals of Galicia willingly call themselves Rusniaks. The Germans, following the Latin, use the form 'Ruthenian' which also has been admitted into French. The conflicts between the two nationalities have engendered ironic and insulting appellations. Thus the Ukrainians call the Great Russians "Katsapy" (Goat-head, because of their beard) or Khazars, and the latter call the Ukrainians "Khokli" (from Khokhol, "top-knot," because of the manner in which the Cossacks formerly dressed their hair).

S.P. T.R. 578 186

Thus there is conflict between the Great Russians and the Ukrainians. This interesting conflict has very old and quite /52/natural causes. The differentiation between the Russians of the north and of the south occurred a long time ago; it has developed little by little, but without pause. Furthermore, there have been grievances and misunderstandings for a very long time between Great Russia and the Ukraine, and their entire life has been completely distinct throughout

1: Niederle--91 E-5 1911 E6 Slavic Peoples E16
Slovenes E F7

S.P. Sl. 163 ● 181 167 In the matter of the birth rate, during these latter years it has been very low in Carniola: between 1890 and 1900, 1.84%; the birth-rate for Austria taken all together is 9.44%. Between 1880 and 1890 the coefficient was 9.44%. For all of the Slovenes taken together the coefficient is only 1.37%.

Therefore, the development of the nation appears to be arrested. This phenomenon is due in part to denationalization, in part to emigration, and in part to inexact census figures.

S.P. Sl. 162 [79] From the religious viewpoint the Slovenes are almost entirely Catholics (99.9%). In respect to occupations, 75.4% devote themselves to farming, 13.4% to industry, 3.5% to trade, and 7.7% to public services.

S.P. Sl. 197 101 S 28. Differentiation.--From a linguistic viewpoint there are rather numerous differences; but they are not very deep (see what is said further along regarding the dialectology of the southern Slavs). To designate the various groups within the nation, the Slovenes usually give themselves geographic names, borrowed from their political boundaries: Kranjci (Carniolians), Primorci /145/ (people of the seacoast), Korosci (Carinthians), Goricani (Goricians), Styrians, or names of an even more local character, borrowed from the orography and the hydrography. In Styria there are singled out the Pohorianci, the Polianci of the Mura and of the Drava, the Halozanes, in Carniola the Gorenici (people from above), Dolenici (people from below), and the Notranjci who speak different dialects. To the north of the Mura, the Prekmurci (Transmurians) present an interesting type. In the northwest of Istria the Savrini or Bresavi are also pure-blooded Slovenes, as are the Berkini in the north of Istria. On the contrary the Fucki in the outskirts of the town of Buzet (Pinguente) and the Cici are Croats of the kaikavski and cakavski dialects. (1) Likewise, the White Krainici--so called from their costume--who are settled between Kocevje and the Kupa River are also of the kaikavski dialect.

1. Although certain philologists attach the Kaikavci of Croatia to the Slovenes, we relegate them to the next chapter; they consider themselves to be Croats.

A very interesting group, particularly studied by Professor Beaudoin de Courtenay (2), is the group of Resians established in the

S.P. C.M. 648 exaggerated claims, without counting Turkey which is today the proprietor of the contested territory, without speaking of the Great Powers, especially Russia, Italy, and Austria, who have their eye on Macedonia.

000 From all of this whirlpool of literary, political, and scientific endeavors, a disinterested observer can draw today only these obvious conclusions:

S.P. C.M. 181 1). The Slavs of Macedonia and of Old Serbia represent a people whose national consciousness is not yet completely and equally developed, if we compare them with the two neighboring nations. However, it is beyond doubt that the largest portion of this people S.P. C.M. [795] feel themselves and proclaim themselves to be Bulgars, that they belong to the independent Bulgarian Church, whose head is the Exarch resident at Ortakioi. (1) On the other hand, it is certain that the

1. According to Brankov, there are in Macedonia 77% Exarchists and 23% Patriarchists. According to Hilmi, the proportion is entirely different. See above in Section 37. 1^

name Bulgars is an historic name in these regions and that it has not been brought in through the religious propaganda of these recent years. Even though these regions were once annexed to the Serbian State, yet the name Serb has not taken root among the people. This is why in recent times the Bulgarian propoganda, both ecclesiastical and political, has found a very deep response throughout the country; Serbian propoganda has a chance of future success only in the northern region which is in contact with the Serbian Kingdom and has direct dealings with it; this region is Old Serbia.

S.P. C.M. 197 2). From a philological point of view it is true that the language of the Slavs of Macedonia presents an aggregation of local dialects rather distinct from one another. They form a sort of idiom which is intermediate between the Serbian stokavski and the Bulgarian language proper. (1) But taken altogether and in certain details it is much more

1. See Section 32, above. 2^

S.P. C.M. [194] [193] closely related to the Bulgarian than to the Serbian. These special traits are the use of the postpositive article (used after the substantive), the loss of declension and the retention of the nasals. Only the dialect of the northern region is more closely related to the dialect group of Vranje, Nish, Timok, which Professor Belic assigns to the domain of the Serbian language, but certain philologists do not agree with him.

For these reasons I have, as may be seen above, and on the map which accompanies this book, assigned the Slavs of Macedonia to the Bulgars, while recognizing that there are in Old Serbia a majority of families who claim to belong to the Serbian nation.

S.P. C.M. 181

3). Moreover, it is certain that this question of deciding whether Macedonia is Serbian or Bulgarian cannot be resolved by secondary linguistic and ethnographic indications, /216/ for example the custom of celebrating the festival called Slava (1), but by other factors, such as historical tradition, ecclesiastical jurisdiction, political ideas and tendencies. But, even from this viewpoint, Macedonia is not tranquil; it is the scene of incessant agitation. Such agitation is carried on by means of political propaganda, by money, through the school, and through the church by both Bulgar and Serb. At the point to which all of these efforts are concentrated they may make of the least conscientious individual a Serb or a Bulgar, despite the dealect which he speaks. All of these factors continue to operate and they will not stop while Macedonia and Old Serbia are outside of the direct control of either Serbia or Bulgaria. The State which may be the first to occupy the region for a long period will be the first one to give it a character.

1. Arannual festival during which the word slava "glory" is frequently repeated, which gives it its name. Translator.

Today Macedonia is Bulgarian; but it is still a question of power and of the future, a question whether it will always remain Bulgarian, or will be Serbianized in part. The natural solution would be for Old Serbia to be assigned to the Serbs and Macedonia to the Bulgars. The relations of these two peoples would then be placed in order and their national development assured. But will such a political and national solution be arrived at for the Macedonian problem? It seems very doubtful.

/217/

SUMMARY

Total Figures for the Slavs.

S.P. 161

S 40.---For the year 1900 I have estimated the total figure for the Slavs at 137 or 138 million. After having revised my estimates in 1908, I arrived at a figure of 139 million, the details of which are

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A folk-lore, and an historical myth, are not sufficient to create a community of political interests. Nor, even, is a 'Cultural Front'. As Pypine, a Russian Westernist, remarked: 'Before imposing a Slavonic civilisation, this would first have had to be created'.

For, in Russia itself, there were two opposing currents regarding the problem of the destinies of the Slavonic world. One, with Tchadaiev, saw Russia's past merely as a chaos of historical misunderstandings, and events devoid of meaning. Such was the doctrine of the Westernists, whose chiefs, moving in aristocratic or liberal circles, considered Europeanism as the measure of good and evil. The other, with the Slavophile school, refused to acknowledge the European culture as universal, and maintained that the country's future lay entirely in the development of her own values.

Between the two schools, Danilevsky, a biologist hostile to the Darwinian theories, about 1860 formulated the problem of the relations between 'Russia and Europe', with all its implications.

He began by stressing the anomaly represented by the notion of Europe—a survival of the *orbis romanus*. There was no real separation between the European and Asiatic continents; the Urals were not a frontier. Now the question of a distinction between Europe and Asia was of prime importance to Russia, placed as she was, like a hinge between these two worlds.

This distinction, although a geographical anachronism, nevertheless corresponded to indisputable facts in the domains of history and civilisation—facts which sufficed to demonstrate that Russia had no decisive bonds with Europe. Danilevsky summed them up as follows:—

The Romance and Germanic peoples had a certain number of features in common, none of which was found in Russia's past.

They divided up the heritage of the Roman Empire, in which Russia had no part.

They were influenced by Germanic institutions, around which crystallised the notion of the State. The West was the patrimony of the countries who succeeded to the Empire of Charlemagne. Now Russia remained outside this community, which the Middle Ages designated under the name of 'Christendom'.

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181 829 177 Russia knew nothing of Feudalism. She remained aloof from the intellectual current which began with Scholasticism and ended with scientific investigation. She was untouched by the Reformation. Whenever she entered into conflict with the Holy See, it was simply as a foreign power.

In short, Russia did not belong to the European family. If she was connected with it, said Danilevsky, it was by adoption, in the manner of a wild stock, on which an exotic branch has been grafted.

181 829 771 But had not religion, at least, engendered a spiritual solidarity between her and the West? Was not Orthodoxy a disruption of the Christian community and had not six centuries of Œcumenism forged indissoluble bonds between the Germano-Roman and the Slavo-Greek worlds?

No, replied Danilevsky. The Western Church was the triumph of Rationalism, differentiated by a positive sign among the Catholics, a negative one among the Protestants. Rome sacrificed internal to external unity, the Reformation sacrificed true liberty to the idea of external liberty. The Eastern Church was neither a system nor a hardened doctrine; it was all love and renunciation. Much more than dogmatic opposition was involved—these were two concepts of the spiritual life which were poles apart. That explained why the Orthodox Christians had come to regard Islam as the involuntary and unwitting saviour of Slavism. By tolerating independent churches under her sway, Islam protected them against the assimilating or unifying ascendency of Latin Catholicism. A Patriarch of Constantinople had said that *Providence had chosen the Osmanlis to defend Orthodoxy against the Western heresy.*

186* 829 So that Russia, according to Danilevsky, saw in Europe nothing to give her a feeling of historical or spiritual solidarity. Such was, moreover, the point of view of the great Russian novelist, Dostoievsky; to show oneself a true Russian was, for him, *to place oneself on the battleground of all European hostilities.* It was to constitute a unity, not *in* Europe, but opposed to it.

The thesis of the biologist met that of the novelist. A harmful policy (said Danilevsky in his turn), during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, associated Russia with the European balance of power. Now this balance of power affected only the

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186* 578 175 the Slavs were to split up between the two camps into which Europe would be divided. So that, except in congresses, where ethnography and philology were discussed, this solidarity remained a myth. Russian egoism bore heavily upon the little 'Pravoslav' countries, in which the Tsarist policy affected to take an interest. Much more than that; certain territories, caught between two Slavonic currents—such as Macedonia, the Ukrainian Marches, the Teschen district of Silesia—kept alive the spirit of dissidence within the Slavonic family.

175 167 What remained of von Moltke's declarations was the obsession of an inevitable reckoning between the two races. Germany, who, from age to age, had extended her sphere of domination at the expense of the Slavs, dimly felt that, one fine day, the latter would grow tired of the role of 'fertilisers' (*Düngervolk*) to which the Pan-Germanic school condemned them. In Merovingian times, a slow but continuous migration, by easy stages, peopled the Eastern Teutonic states with Slavs. These tribes had reached the Elbe and the Oder by the fourth century. To designate the Teutonic peoples, they forged the collective appellation, *Niemtse,* which has remained in the modern vocabulary of the Slavonic peoples, and signifies 'dumb ones', *i.e.,* speaking a language unintelligible to Slavs. But, little by little, the ebb of the Teutonic tribes pushed them back. With the exception of a few descendants of the Pomeranians (the Kachoubes and the Slovinces) and of the Sorabes (Lusatians), the vast group of Western Slavs of the Elbe and the Baltic disappeared in the struggle waged against them by the Germans in the four centuries from the time of Charlemagne to the twelfth century.

829 167 • 181 This withdrawal is explained by the state of dissension—a hereditary defect with the Slavs—in which these populations lived. An Austrian historian of this century, J. Peisker,[1] was so struck by such a large-scale backward drive, that he sought a different explanation for it. The past, he said, shows such a succession of conquests, and establishments of Teutonism in Slavonic territory, that we cannot attribute it to the fortune of war. We are obliged to suppose the existence of some factor which paralysed the resistance of the Slavs. This factor must

113 [1] *Die Älteren Beziehungen der Slawen zu Turkotataren und Germanien.* Berlin, 1905.

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be sought in the most remote centuries, in the contact of the Slavs with the Turanian peoples of the Steppes, who were the foundation of the so-called 'Scythic' Iranian population. From time immemorial, the Turko-tartar peoples, by their pillaging raids, have borne heavily on the Iranians, their immediate neighbours, and, through them, on the Slavonic peoples. The Iranians have been the victims of the Turkomans of the salt Steppes—and the Slavs, by repercussion, have shared their fate. Having thus exhausted their political and social strength, they have become the chronic prey of the conquerors.

This thesis of an original curse, whatever its scientific value, should be borne in mind, for it justifies a conviction that is widespread among the Germans, *viz.*, the inferiority of the Slavonic race, and its presumed incapacity to develop from the notion of a clan to that of a State. There have been published anthologies of German thinkers and propagandists on this theme, which is summed up in the well-known witticism *Gute Nacht, Russen, nach Asien!*—which the Germans have invoked, even down to our own times, to justify considering Eastern Europe merely as a contemptible suburb of Teutonism.

Such is the background of history on which was projected the 'reckoning' on which Bethmann-Hollweg and von Moltke had banked. Must we, however, go so far as to say that the War of 1914 was a Teuto-Slavonic war? M. Benes considers this thesis as attractive as it is untenable. He regards this war as a struggle between two political and philosophical conceptions, the logical development of the European evolution which, beginning at the Renaissance, culminated in the triumph of political individualism, of parliamentary and constitutional law. The war, he says, was not Teuto-Slavonic in character, nor in aims, nor in results.

Limited to the strict sequence of facts, this judgement is admissible. While Austria-Hungary threw herself into the war to prevent a rupture of her interior balance to the advantage of the Slavs, deeper and more decisive causes armed the Great Powers one against the other.

If, however, we consider the atmosphere that reigned in Europe in 1914, when the war found so many inflammable substances in a state of suspense, M. Benes's point of view seems more contestable. The interests of the Slavs were neither

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Russian civilisation is founded on Orthodox Christianity, the Polish on Catholicism. All these theories, among their chief representatives, had no political character; it was a programme of cultural and intellectual solidarity, in no wise a political Panslavism. Slavonic Messianism is, scientifically, as untenable as all Messianic aspirations, the Teutonic included'.[8]

For Edward Benes, the Slavonic aspirations had no practical significance, except inasmuch as they furthered a democratic and revolutionary ideal. 'The new Slavonic idea will consider as definitely buried everything that recalls Panslavism, Slavophilia and Panrussianism. . . . It seems to me simply ridiculous to wish to confine Russia and the Russian people within the limits of the "Slavonic policy", of Slav solidarity in Central Europe, and other conceptions of that kind. The role of Russia and of the Russian people is much more vast; the evolution of the world summons Russia to a more important mission. I reject, and especially in the interest of Russia's great mission, all Slavism, and all Slav solidarity which, whether directly or by their consequences, would prove to be purely and simply Russianism or Russophilia. . . . The new Slav solidarity has no desire to fall into the mysticism of the old. It accepts life and the world as they are, and takes as its essential basis the great victory won by democracy during the European War and revolutions. This new Slavism, freed from all the unacceptable ideologies of the past, . . . borrows two great ideas from tradition and from the principle of all the great spirits and all the heroes of Slavonic culture: the idea of democracy and the idea of humanity'.[9]

Let us say briefly (and with all the reservations implied in a condensed judgement) that the official position of Czechoslovakia was then dominated by a spiritual assumption—attachment to the democratic conceptions of the West—and by the economic exigencies of a new, highly-industrialised State. Politics based on sentiment and ideology were distrusted—which does not mean (as we shall see farther on) that they were entirely excluded.

In Yugoslavia, on the contrary, they professed, with varying shades corresponding to the different aspects of internal policy,

[8] T. G. Masaryk, *The Resurrection of a State*, p. 398.
[9] Article published in the *Slovansky prehled* (The Slavonic Review) of Prague in 1925, *passim*.

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Then there is the 'Balkan fact', with all that it implies of suspicion and particularities. It is commonly explained by the geographic configuration of the Peninsula, furrowed by valleys which have no inter-communication. No doubt the physical relief tends to perpetuate the clan spirit throughout all the various changes of sovereignty. But the ethnical variety does not give an exhaustive image of the Balkan mentality. Nor does the long practice of the *Divide ut imperes* principle, which was the Alpha and Omega of the Habsburg policy in the Balkans. These States, before becoming the successors to Austria-Hungary, were the heirs of Byzantium, and we may wonder whether the passion-charged atmosphere, the complex of distrust and turbulence which characterise them, are not a survival of Byzantine influence, in opposition to that Roman continuity and that tendency to universalism whose determining effects on Western civilisation have been analysed by Fustel de Coulanges, Dopsch and Pirenne.

* * *

An event of incalculable significance for the Slavonic world occurred about the year 1933: the reappearance of Moscow on the European diplomatic stage—coinciding, if not tallying, with the rehabilitation by the Soviets of national values in Russian history.

In its critical years, the Bolshevist régime had relegated the racial idea to the status of romantic nonsense. 'Slavophilia', frowned upon as it was by the last Tsarist governments, still had about it an odour of reactionary and religious mysticism which would have been sufficient to keep it on the black-list, even had the idea of ethnical solidarity found a place in Marxist terminology. On the other hand, the policy of nationalities pursued by the U.S.S.R. had breathed new life into hitherto inorganic or unrecognised ethnical groups. In the time of the Tsars, who would have dreamed that Russia comprised no less than fifty nationalities or ethnical groups? It would have been ill-timed to give these people the impression that there existed in the U.S.S.R. a privileged race, whose traditions or ambitions dominated the life of the country, relegating the allogeneous republics to the condition of satellites. Decentralisation diluted Russian Slavism, and the plurality of tongues favoured by the Socialist Revolution deprived it of its trump card.

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There was something else they forgot in Berlin—the fact that the prestige of the Reich, in the whole of this sector, was doubly handicapped—handicapped by a generalised scorn of death and by the state of mind of peasants who, having seen, in one and the same generation, the collapse of Ottoman Turkey, Tsarist Russia, and the Habsburg Empire, instinctively failed to consider any hegemonic experiments as permanent. The majority of these nations have been hardened to defeat, as well as to recovery; consequently they believe neither in lasting adversity nor in the permanence of strength. They are the uncertain factor in the European pattern.

In short, in the brief historical parenthesis represented by the domination of the Axis in Eastern Europe, there was no elimination, but first transfer and then coalition of irredentisms. We may say that the incoherence of the concepts elaborated by the Axis Powers and their inability to remedy it, were the best retrospective justification of the treaties which had put an end to the previous war, though this should not lead us to underestimate their errors and omissions.

The decisive turning-point of the war—Russia's entry into the campaign—will remain a key-event in the history of the Slavonic peoples. At the moment when this occurred, some tens of millions of Slavs were perishing under Nazi oppression. It was impossible for this mortal duel between two giants not to flood their hearts with tremendous hope, replacing the discouragement that the unnatural *entente* sealed in Moscow had caused them. The war of which Russia was, for several years, to bear the heavy burden was a real 'war of liberation'. For the first time, in a political speech, made to the Soviet Assembly in Moscow on November 6, 1941, Stalin used the expression 'Russian people' (*Rouski Narod*) in preference to 'Soviet Union'. 'These people (the Nazis), devoid of conscience and honour, have the cynicism to summon the nations to the destruction of the great Russian nation, the nation of Plekhanovs, Lenins, Bilenskys and Tchernichevskys, Pushkins and Tolstoys, Gorkys and Tchekhovs, Setchenovs and Pvalovs, Rapins and Surikovs, Suvorovs and Kutusovs'. To this panorama of Russian genius he added a solemn pledge, calculated to reassure the nations of Eastern Europe, as to the price of the liberty he promised them and which he was to bring them. 'We have no intention of

6z Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16

Chapter Five

RUSSIA AS ARBITER OF THE SLAVONIC NATIONS

IN the conditions under which it was realised, the liberation of Eastern Europe by the Soviet armies radically transformed the factors in the Slavonic problem. All the aims that the feeling of historical and racial solidarity had assigned to the Slavs were suddenly outstripped.

The First World War had resulted in their emancipation. As we have pointed out, this emancipation was due no less to the collapse of Tsarist Russia than to the victory of the Western Democracies. It had 'set up a home' for the Slavonic nations, free of mortgage on their national sovereign rights, without predominance of any one nation over the others. The two tasks imposed on them had been, on the one hand, the creation of inter-Slav ties—political, economic, and spiritual—on the other, a reorganisation of their relations with Russia.

The first of these tasks had been but imperfectly realised. The evolution of the international situation between the two wars was calculated rather to dissociate than to regroup the energies of the Slavonic world. And once again in history the Second World War had found the Slavonic nations in opposing camps.

As for relations with Moscow, they were diffident and inconsistent; where they did issue in positive agreements, these were hedged with cautious circumlocutions, and lacked a well-defined scope.

With the liberation, and the presence of the Red armies on their territory, the Slavonic peoples glimpsed a plan of their international life which was very different from the one they had known between 1919 and 1940. The new Governments had been formed under the eyes of the Liberator and, in the majority of cases, from elements devoted to the Soviet ideology. Under colour of 'anti-Fascism' a tidal wave swept away the old groups, accused of having, before or during the war, supported Axis designs. In reality the 'purge' marked an operation of a revolutionary nature, characterised by the rise to power of the

6: Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16

'Young Brigade', and by the predominance of the 'social' over the 'political' and even over the 'national'.

This revolution was in the logic of events; was there any need to invoke the ascendancy or the presence of Russia to explain it? On emerging from an upheaval unprecedented in their history, the little nations, stupefied by the blow and completely helpless, saw their recent past only as error or treason.

We cannot even reproach Russia with having bound up her action with a policy of patronage or aimed at an ideological synchronisation of the régimes born on the territories she had liberated. In Hungary, for example, she was very careful not to recreate the atmosphere of the time of Bela Kun, whose sinister memory, she found, was still alive.

But, in the Slavonic countries, the parties of the extreme Left, almost everywhere identified with the Resistance, took advantage of the presence and the prestige of Russia in order to get into power and stay there. This led to a misunderstanding which, by associating the Russian authorities with the Governments which they were believed to favour, risked one day exposing the popularity of the Soviet Union in these countries to a turn in the tide of internal politics.

Obliged henceforth to gravitate in the orbit of the powerful Russian State, the Slavonic nations could not consider the future from the same angle as they had done in 1918. At the conclusion of a devastating war, Russia would never again allow neighbouring States to serve as a diplomatic or military jumping-off ground for a possible adversary. She regarded them as her security ramp.

One might be tempted to see in this Muscovite hold over Eastern Europe a revolution of an international order. In truth it was a revolution only in relation to an abnormal state of affairs—that of the 1920–1940 period, which rested on Russia's inertia in Europe. It could not reasonably be expected that this state of affairs would last indefinitely. The Europe of 1945 was more logical than that of 1918—at any rate, more in conformity with the classic play of international forces.

The slogan of Slav solidarity, which formed the *leit-motiv* of the Moscow Congresses of 1942–1944, had galvanised and co-ordinated the movements for resistance to the invader. In

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on the basis of respect for the principle of nationalities'. No reference to a federal system.

He returned to Czechoslovakia early in March, 1945, and, from Kosice, he followed the last stages of the liberation. On May 10 the national flag again floated from Prague Castle and Cathedral; a few days later Benes made a triumphal entry into the city.

The Government (formed on April 5, under the presidency of M. Fierlinger, and composed of twenty-five members, seven of whom were Communists) avoided the mistake made by the majority of the liberated countries, by postponing the elections until passions had had time to subside a little. The authorised political parties, four in number, agreed on the allocation of mandates to the Provisional National Assembly, which numbered 300 deputies, including 100 for Slovakia. On April 14[1] an electoral body chosen by the local National Committees nominated the members of this Assembly. 'The Czechs', Benes said, 'must take radical measures, while at the same time avoiding extremism'. That was the whole programme of the Czechoslovak Popular Front.

In the international order, the Government observed the same prudence. Benes's realistic attitude towards Soviet Russia is well known. 'The Czechs are a Slavonic people, and they are specially drawn towards the Russians, whom they understand better than any other people'. But Czech culture, and the democratic education of the Czech people, are fundamentally Western. The President continually returned to that assumption. Czechoslovakia is an intermediary region between two civilisations; its historical evolution, its psychology, its intellectual and social structure, all have affinities with the Anglo-American and French democracies.

The Soviet orientation was represented by the Communists, under the leadership of the Deputy Prime Minister, M. Clement Gottwald, and the Minister of National Education, Zdenek Nejedly, a celebrated musicographer, who attended the Moscow Panslav Congresses. But their influence was exerted moderately, and solely on the lines of the national interest. In reality, the Czech people, with their habits of thrift, their appreciation of property, their aversion to conformity, are fundamentally opposed to the Marxist ideology.

1 [1945 -- Analyst]

6: Mousset H-4 (no date) 1950 E16 Slavic Peoples E16

from England the legal recognition which she had refused to a non-Communist Ministry. However, the Foreign Office felt bound to state that this recognition 'by no means implied that Great Britain considered the methods previously employed by the Bulgarian Government to consolidate its position, or the conditions under which the elections had been organised, as conforming to the spirit and the letter of the Yalta declaration concerning Liberated Europe'.

The Bulgarian reply dismissed these objections, but expressed the Sofia Government's satisfaction and its desire to respect the peace treaty.

The Constitution submitted to the Legislature had to reconcile the exigencies of a very Leftist democracy with the specific traits of the Bulgarian nation, and the laws of its historical development. It was not federal, like the Russian or Yugoslav constitutions, but unitary. Bulgaria was to be a parliamentary republic, in which authority belonged to the people, whose will was expressed by means of elections or a referendum. The President was elected for four years (by a two-thirds majority) by the Legislature, plus one representative from each Cantonal Council and five representatives from each Departmental Council. The Legislature was elected for four years, on the basis of one member for every 25,000 inhabitants.

The Constitution sanctioned the right to private property and the right of inheritance, but placed in the hands of the State the country's natural resources, its sub-soil, transport, marine and fluvial navigation, communications, radio, and external trade. The new Bulgarian economy was inspired by the co-operative principle as understood in the Slavonic tradition (*mir* or *zadrouga*) rather than by pure collectivism.

In his ministerial declaration M. George Dimitrov had defined friendship with U.S.S.R. as 'the corner-stone of his foreign policy', but promised to endeavour to normalise relations with London and Washington. He expressed his gratitude 'to the sister nations—and particularly the new Yugoslavia[10]—for the help they had rendered to Bulgaria at the Peace Conference'.

Indeed, Bulgaria had no reason to complain of the Con-

[10] Who, on the previous June 15, had wiped out certain Bulgarian reparations.

7; Lednicki S-4 (no date) 1948 E16 Slavic Peoples E16

unity among the Slavs would still appear very difficult. The cultural differentiation in the march of historical development became so deep that the parental affinities in the Slavic family have been completely lost. And today the cultural type of a Russian differs greatly from the cultural Polish type, and this would be true for all other Slavic examples.

How significant, although in part paradoxical in the light of the events of this war, are the following remarks of Vladimir Solov'ev: "Poland is in Eastern Europe the representative of the spiritual principle which became the basis of Western history. In its spiritual essence the Polish nation, and with it all Catholic Slavs, belong to the Western world. The spirit is stronger than blood; in spite of a blood antipathy toward Germans and blood nearness to Russia, the representatives of Polonism would accept Germanization rather than a union with Russia. A Western European, even a Protestant, is nearer by spirit to a Catholic Pole than an Orthodox Russian. Being the foremost fighters for Western principles, Poles see in Russia the East, hostile to their spiritual essence, an alien and dark force. . . ."[99] "The East," says Solov'ev, "worked out an order of ideas in which man was subordinated to supernatural power. The West created the ideal of the independence of man. In the East the state enslaved the peoples, while Greece elaborated the ideal of the freedom of the peoples. The supernatural element and the predominance of the state have given rise to the idea of resignation. Greece and Rome with their republics developed the principle of spiritual energy and popular activity." (Cf. *ibid.*)

Cultural differentiation represents progress, and the idea of racial unification might be considered as essentially reactionary. And indeed the Panslavistic doctrine is an anti-historical, anti-cultural, and anti-European idea, not only because of its anti-European political implications but because Panslavism refers first of all to theories of racial superiority, supporting them by dubious

[99] V. S. Solov'ev, *Velikii Spor i Khristianskaya Politika*. Cf. *Sobr. Soch.* 2, IV, 15.